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Abstract. This paper aims at contributing to explain the observed high per-
sistence of cross country differences in inequality and levels of redistribution.
It focusses on the interactions between inequality and the predominance of
either horizontal coalitions (i.e. among individuals of similar economic sta-
tus) or vertical ones (among individuals with different economic status). The
paper shows that the interactions between inequality and the type of coali-
tion formed in a society can give rise to self-sustained social contracts where
inequality persists: because the poor take time to organize, when inequality
is high, the poor are particularly vulnerable to consumption fluctuations and
are willing to give up substantial redistribution in order to be protected from
these. For the rich, this traditional social contract is an investment. If the
rate of return to alternative investments rises substantially or the elite becomes
weakened, this traditional social contract may break, paving the way for work-
ing class organization and a permanent decrease in inequality. Differences in
inequality between Latin America (and the Middle East) and contemporary
Western Europe are discussed in the light of the model. The European trans-
formation in inequality, redistribubtion and social relations in Modern times
is also discussed focusing on England.
1. Introduction
Differences in levels of inequality are remarkably persistent across countries and
broad world regions. Latin America and parts of Africa come to mind as tradi-
tionally high inequality regions, compared to, say, Western Europe and South East
Asia, and remain largely so still today. From the 70s to the 90s, for instance, the
average decadal Gini coefficient in Latin America ranged from 48.8 to 52.2. For
Asia the range is between 40.2 and 41.2, while for Eastern Europe, the figures are
32.3 and 34.2 (De Ferranti et al. (2003)). A similar picture emerges using data
extending further back into the past. Data recently compiled by Frankema (2006),
on land inequality stretching over the whole XXth century, shows Latin American
Gini coefficients (averaged over quarters of a century) ranging between 76.6 and
77.9. The figures for Asia are, in contrast, 47.6 and 48.0. The small across-time
variation within regions contrasts strikingly with the wide differences across regions,
revealing a substantial degree of inequality persistence.
This paper proposes a novel political economy mechanism that can help explain-
ing why differences in inequality tend to be so persistent across countries. The
mechanism proposed is based on the type of coalitions different agents choose to
form. In particular, it hinges on whether poor agents (or citizens) tend to organize
horizontally (i.e. among themselves) or form a coalition with the elite (i.e. a verti-
cal coalition). The paper argues that coalitions arising when inequality is high will
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tend to redistribute less and vice versa. In that way, it makes a case for regarding
the type of coalition formed as an element contributing to inequality persistence.
The importance of the type of coalition formed for the dynamics of inequality
has been recently put forward in De Ferranti et al. (2003). Studying the reasons
for the persistently high inequality observed in Latin America, the authors em-
phasize the prevalence of vertical coalitions in the region. Other studies hint at
the likely relevance of these forces from a historical perspective. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000), Justman and Gradstein (1999) and Lindert (2004) emphasize the
importance of political voice for the dynamics of redistribution and inequality. In
particular, they argue that the transition towards the comparatively low degree
of inequality observed in European countries starting around the beginning of the
twentieth century is related to the increasing political voice of the poor segments
of society. To the extent that these, and other studies, link increasing political
voice (particularly through franchise extension) to the revolutionary threats im-
posed by the poor, the importance of horizontal organization for redistribution and
inequality is warranted.1 All these studies thus point at the relevance of horizontal
coalitions for explaining observed degrees of inequality. In order for this mechanism
to account for its persistence, however, the (reverse) link between inequality and
the type of coalition formed needs to be incorporated into the analysis.
This paper studies these two-way interactions between inequality and the choice
of horizontal vs. vertical coalitions by developing a simple two-period model. In
the model, there are two types of individuals, rich and poor, who produce, save
and consume. Rich individuals have access to a technology that yields positive
returns to their savings2. In this context, individuals may form horizontal or vertical
coalitions. A horizontal coalition yields exogenously given redistribution levels and
takes time to build. Thus, it leads to redistribution of resources from the rich to
the poor only in the second period; in the first period, before the poor have had
time to organize, the opposite may even occur. Redistribution levels in a vertical
coalition, in contrast, are chosen by the elite, and can be implemented immediately.
This setting seems plausible in societies where the local dimension in politics is
prominent, as is the case in many preindustrial or industrializing societies. Then,
the local elites can easily "buy off" the local population while global horizontal
coalitions are particularly difficult to build. More generally, coordination problems
for agreeing on agendas, leadership, etc. seem more acute in horizontal coalitions
rather than in vertical ones, thus justifying that a horizontal coalition brings benefits
for the poor only in the long run, and may even carry costs in the short run.
This setting gives rise to insights of some generality. A vertical coalition may
arise because the poor are willing to give up redistribution in exchange for smooth-
ing consumption fluctuations over time. Redistribution is thus lower in a vertical
coalition. Moreover, due to Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) utility, the
poor are more vulnerable to consumption fluctuations the poorer they are. Thus,
the rich are willing to engage in a vertical coalition only when the poor are suf-
ficiently poor; i.e. when inequality is sufficiently high. In this way, the model
captures neatly that the vertical coalition is an investment for the elite. The model
1Besides the aforementioned studies, Conley and Temimi (2001) and Jack and Lagunoff (2004)
also stress the importance of revolutionary threats by the poor for franchise extensions.
2The fact that only the rich have access to this technology can be rationalized by fixed costs
preventing the poor for undertaking the investment.
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is extended to account for inequality dynamics. Two stable inequality steady states
may arise: high inequality perpetuates through the formation of a vertical coali-
tion, which leads to little redistribution while low inequality perpetuates through a
highly redistributive horizontal coalition. The high inequality steady state fails to
exist if returns to alternative investments (here, returns to savings) are sufficiently
high, as the investment in the vertical coalition becomes less attractive for the rich.
The paper discusses briefly differences in inequality between contemporary West-
ern Europe on the one hand, and Latin America and the Middle East on the other,
in the light of the model proposed. The West European transition from high to low
inequality around the beginning of the XXth century is also discussed, focusing on
the experience of England.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
the type of coalition chosen for different levels of inequality as well as the equilib-
rium relation between inequality and redistribution. The dynamics of inequality
are subsequently analyzed. Section 3 discusses briefly, in the light of the model,
differences in inequality across certain regions of the world as well as its develop-
ment in Western Europe, focusing on England. Finally, Section 4 provides some
concluding remarks.
2. Related Literature
A particularly relevant piece in the understanding inequality persistence is the
relationship between inequality and redistribution. To the extent that inequality
is negatively related to redistribution, inequality differences are likely to persist.
This is not, however, the standard political economy view on this relationship. The
standard story essentially argues that more unequal societies ought redistribute
more, since the median voter tends to be poorer relative to the mean (see, for in-
stance, Meltzer and Richards (1981), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and
Rodrick (1994)). This view has been increasingly challenged for its lack of empir-
ical support. Even if no consensus has yet emerged, empirical studies increasingly
find that more unequal societies tend to redistribute less, not more, both when
comparing across countries and over time (see Lindert (2004) and De Mello and
Tiongson (2003)). As a result, several alternative mechanisms have been proposed
in the literature, yielding a negative relationship between inequality a redistribu-
tion (Benabou (2000), Saint Paul (2001), Rodriguez (2004). See also Saint Paul
and Verdier (1996)). This paper points at an additional channel through which
inequality may be negatively related to redistribution: the type of coalition that
prevails in a society.
A second important type of literature this paper relates to, is the recent liter-
ature on co-optation. Bertocchi and Spagat (2001), and the broader studies on
regime-opposition interactions in authoritarian regimes, such as Wintrobe (1998)
and Bueno de la Mesquita et al. (2003), all point at the importance of the co-
optation of the opposition for authoritarian regime survival or its demise. Unlike
all these studies, this paper bring inequality directly into the picture, studying the
two-way interactions between inequality and the degree of co-optation of the pop-
ulation. Furthermore, using a two-period model and allowing for a more realistic
(curved) utility function, this paper is able to cleanly characterize co-optation as
an investment for the elite, and hence extract implications regarding rates of return
to alternative investments.
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Besides these strands of literature, this paper is related to two other types of
literature. One is the literature studying demand for redistribution in modern so-
cieties and the traditional puzzle of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in
democracies (see Putterman, Roemer and Silvestre (1998)). The present paper
argues that the poor may be willing to give up redistribution in exchange for con-
sumption smoothing if horizontal organization takes time to yield results.3 A final
strand of related literature is the emerging literature on franchise extension, par-
ticularly those models emphasizing the threat of revolution in the extension of the
suffrage (see above). The important contributions of Acemoglu and Robinson to
this literature hinge crucially on the assumptions that revolutionary opportunities
for the poor are temporary and that these opportunities arrive exogenously. As
the authors themselves acknowledge, the arrival of these opportunities are related
to, among others, the level of organization of civil society. Indeed, the fact that
serious revolutionary threats were relatively absent from Western Europe before
the XVIIIth century can hardly be considered random. The model in this paper,
while not considering franchise extension as such, yields additional insights into the
problem by endogeneizing the choice of organization of the poor and analyzing its
relation to inequality.
3. The Model
3.1. Environment. Consider a two-period economy with a continuum 1 of agents.
A proportion λ of these agents are poor and the remaining, (1− λ) , are rich, where
λ > 12 . Individuals are born endowed capital, which, in this economy, represents
physical capital, human capital, land, or a mix of the three. In particular, poor
and rich individuals are endowed with kP and kR units of capital, respectively,
where kP < kR. Agents live for two periods. In each period, capital is used to
produce a consumption good y according to a linear technology, which is assumed
to take the simple form yi = ki, for i = P,R. Production at the end of the first
period can be saved or consumed. It is assumed that savings yield a higher returns
for rich than for poor individuals. For simplicity, it assumed that returns for the
rich equal BR > 1 while those for the poor equal BP = 1. This assumption
can be thought of as capturing the presence of some fixed cost that prevent the
poor from undertaking investment opportunities. Finally, individuals derive utility
from consumption at the end of each period. For simplicity, the utility function is
assumed to be logarithmic and the time discount factor is assumed to equal one.
The poor have the opportunity to force redistribution of assets k. Doing so,
however, requires building a coalition among themselves; i.e. a horizontal coalition.
It is assumed that a horizontal coalition can only force asset redistribution from the
rich to the poor in the second period. This critical assumption captures the idea
that horizontal organization takes time to form, possibly for coordination problems.
Before the poor have organized (i.e. in the first period), the rich are able to extract
a proportion µ of the wealth of the poor. Once the poor are organized, in the
second period, total assets are divided between the poor and the rich according to
the proportions θ and 1− θ, respectively. It is assumed that µ < θλ ; i.e that in the
second period, each poor displays more post-redistribution resources than in the
3Bertola and Koeniger (2005) also relate consumption smoothing to demand for redistribution
by arguing that credit constraints enhance the demand for redistribution by tempering the relative
value of future upward mobility.
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first. Notice that, if θ = λ, assets are completely equalized across the population
in a second period with a horizontal coalition. From the above, the value functions
for each group in case of a horizontal coalition, UHi , equal:
UHP = Max
S
log (µkP − SP ) + log
(
θ
λ
k + SP
)
UHR = Max
S
log
(
kR +
λ
1− λ (1− µ) kP − SR
)
+ log
(
1− θ
1− λk +BRSR
)
where k = (1− λ) kR + λkP .
In order to prevent forced redistribution, the rich may offer the formation of a
vertical coalition. In a vertical coalition, the rich offer resources in order to limit
the extent of future redistribution. Crucially, a vertical coalition allows for an im-
mediate transfer of resources where each poor receives 12T . Due to commitment
problems, however, transfers in a vertical coalition cannot be intertemporally tai-
lored: all transfers need to be done in the first period. These capital transfers
are kept for the two periods so that each poor effectively receives an amount T of
transfers over her lifetime. Thus, the corresponding value functions are
UVP = Max
S
log
[(
kP +
T
2
)
− S
]
+ log
[(
kP +
T
2
)
+ S
]
UVR = Max
S
log
[(
kR − λ1− λ
T
2
)
− S
]
+ log
[(
kR − λ1− λ
T
2
)
+BRS
]
,
The timing of the model is as follows. First, the rich decide whether to offer
or not the formation of a vertical coalition and, if so, the amount of transfers
associated to it. Then, the poor decide whether to reject or accept the offer. The
corresponding asset transfers or (regressive) redistribution take place. With those,
agents produce and take their savings/ consumption decisions and the first period
ends. In the second period, (progressive) redistribution occurs in the case of a
horizontal coalition. Agents then produce while the rich obtain the returns from
their investment. Finally, agents consume all their income and die.
Capital markets play a key role in this model in one single respect: it is assumed,
plausibly, that in case of a horizontal coalition, borrowing against future redistri-
bution is not permitted. Besides this case, all optimal savings decisions will be
non-negative.
It is worth stressing that redistribution in this model is restricted to assets. In
particular, savings and the income accruing from them are not subject to redis-
tribution. In this sense, this model can be well suited to analyze situations such
as mostly agricultural societies - where the main distributional conflict is land but
where the elite is engaged additionally in mercantilist or capitalist activities - as
well as modern developing economies where the elite is able to invest abroad.
3.2. Inequality, Coalitions and Redistribution. The model is solved by back-
ward induction. The savings decisions are solved in the first place, leading to
indirect utility functions. Second, the minimum transfer required for the poor to
accept the vertical coalition is derived, for each level of inequality. Finally, for each
level of inequality, the equilibrium coalition and the amount of transfers is then
determined by the choices of the rich.
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Consider first the options of the poor individuals. Their savings decisions are
straightforward: In the vertical coalition, since income in the first and second peri-
ods is the same and since savings give return equal to unity, the optimal choice is
to save exactly zero. In the horizontal coalition, in contrast, future redistribution
gains make income higher in the second than in the first period. Thus, optimal
savings, if unconstrained, would be negative. Since borrowing against future re-
distribution is not allowed by assumption, optimal savings will be also zero. The
indirect utility functions for the poor can thus be directly written.
It will prove useful to normalize all variables by the average capital k. As will
become clear below, doing so will leave all relevant expressions as a function of kP
k
,
which will be denoted simply by k ∈ (0, 1) , and will be the measure of equality
used. Likewise, total transfers in a vertical coalition normalized by average capital
T
k
will be denoted by t. In that way, the value functions of the poor in the horizontal
and the vertical coalitions become, respectively:
UHP = log µk
θ
λ
k
2(1)
UVP = log
(
k +
t
2
)2
k
2(2)
The minimum transfers required for poor individuals not to engage in a horizon-
tal coalition can now be derived. Equalizing (1), and (2) yields
tV =
(
µk +
θ
λ
− 2k
)
−
(√
θ
λ
−
√
µk
)2
(3)
This expression has a simple interpretation. The first term,
(
θ
λ + µk − 2k
)
, is
the total redistribution received by each poor agent in the event of a horizontal
coalition, normalized by average capital (call it tH ≡ µkP+ θλk−2kP
k
). The second
term,
(√
θ
λ −
√
µk
)2
, is the distance between consumption in the two periods with
a horizontal coalition - again normalized by average capital. Thus, it represents
the costs of horizontal organization due to its lack of inter-temporal consumption
smoothing.
Expression 3 shows directly that the poor are willing to give up redistribution
in order to smooth consumption. The second term in the expression, moreover,
makes clear that the poorer they are, the more redistribution they are willing to
give up in order to avoid consumption fluctuations over time. This is because log
utility exhibits Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion, whereby aversion to additive
fluctuations decreases with wealth. This feature of the utility function is broadly
consistent with the observed attitudes towards risk (see Gollier (2001)) and captures
the idea that poorer individuals are more vulnerable to consumption fluctuations.
Given the minimum transfers just derived, the rich decide whether to offer a
vertical coalition or not by comparing the value they obtain from the two types
of coalitions. Deriving the standard first order conditions for savings, normalizing
by average capital, substituting tV in 3 in the vertical coalition and rearranging in
order to highlight their common structure, the following indirect utility functions
are obtained:
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UHR = log
(
χ
(
1− λ
θ
λ + µBRk
1 +BR
))2
(4)
UVR = log
(
χ
(
1− λ
√
µk
θ
λ
))2
(5)
where χ ≡ 1+BR
2
√
BR
1
1−λk.
It is now possible to derive the equilibrium coalition in this economy as a func-
tion of inequality by comparing 4, and 5. The following proposition states the
corresponding results:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium coalition depends on inequality in the following
way:
a) if k > k∗ ≡ θλµ 1B2R , the Horizontal Coalition is chosen
b) otherwise, the Vertical Coalition is chosen
Proof. Just compare 4 and 5 ¤
Proposition 1 makes two relevant points. First, in this model the horizontal
coalition arises only when the economy is sufficiently equal. From DARA utility, as
the poor become poorer, they become more vulnerable to consumption fluctuations
and are willing to give up more future redistribution in exchange for inter-temporal
consumption smoothing. This makes a vertical coalition worth for the rich only
when inequality is sufficiently high.
A second set of relevant results from Proposition 1 regards the inequality thresh-
olds separating each coalition. First, a vertical coalition is less likely the higher is
the rate of return on savings BR. In this model, a vertical coalition is, for the rich,
an investment: it implies giving up resources now in the form of transfers in ex-
change for reductions in redistribution in the future. As the rate of return on other
investment rises, savings in the first period become more valuable, and make the
investment in the vertical coalition relatively less attractive. The opposite occurs
the more important worker organization is for redistribution. If the gains that the
poor obtain in a horizontal coalition once they are organized (in the second-period)
θ
λ rise relative to what they can keep while they are not (in the first period) µ, the
vertical coalition becomes more likely. This is because the horizontal coalition be-
comes less attractive for the poor, since it worsens the inter-temporal consumption
fluctuations.
3.3. Inequality Dynamics and Steady States. The essentially negative rela-
tionship between inequality and redistribution through the type of coalition formed
(high inequality - vertical coalition - low redistribution and vice versa) hints at
the possibility of multiple steady states. In order to cleanly illustrate the dynam-
ics of inequality and redistribution in this model, I consider the simplest possible
inter-generational transmission of resources. In particular, each individual has one
offspring, which inherits the capital that her parent owned when old (i.e. in the
second period).
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The evolution of inequality over time is determined by kt which is, as before, the
capital of poor individuals normalized by average capital. In this way, the dynamics
of inequality are characterized by the following equation in differences:
√
µkt
θ
λ
if kt <
θ
λµ
1
R2
kt+1 = f (kt) =
{
θ
λ
otherwise
The function f (kt) is a piece-wise defined function where each piece corre-
sponds to the type of coalition emerging from a given degree of inequality kt (as
stated in Proposition 1). If inequality is high (kt < θλµ 1R2 ), a vertical coalition
is formed and the offspring of a poor individual inherits the parent's capital plus
the transfers; normalized by average capital to obtain our measure for inequality
and substituting for the equilibrium value of transfers in the vertical coalition (in
3) yields
√
µkt
θ
λ . Otherwise, if inequality is low, the poor offspring inherits the
second period outcome from a horizontal coalition, which, again normalized, yields
simply θλ . Taking as given an arbitrary level of inequality at time zero k0 6= 0,
these expressions fully characterize the dynamics of inequality in this model. The
following proposition states the corresponding results.
Proposition 2. 1) If µR > 1, inequality converges to a unique stable steady state
where the coalition is horizontal and where asset inequality equals kS = θλ .
2) If µR < 1 < µR2, there are two stable steady states, one where the coalition
is horizontal, with kS = θλ and another one where the coalition is vertical, with
kS = µ
θ
λ . Inequality is higher and the redistribution rate is lower in kS than in kS .
Furthermore, in that case,
i) if k0 > θλµ 1R2 inequality converges to kS and,
ii) otherwise, inequality converges to kS.
3) If µR2 < 1, inequality converges to a unique steady state where the coalition
is vertical and where asset inequality is kS = µ θλ .
Proof. Results concerning the horizontal coalition steady state are straightforward.
For the vertical coalition, the steady state is kS such that t (kS) = 0; its value can
be directly derived from 3. This steady state is stable because the derivative of
kt + t (kt) =
√
µkt
θ
λ with respect to kt, evaluated at kS equals 12 < 1.
The vertical (horizontal) coalition steady state exists if f (kt) evaluated at k∗ cor-
responding to the vertical (horizontal) coalition is lower (higher) than k∗. Solving
these inequalities yields directly the corresponding results. ¤
Proposition 2 states that there can be one or two stable steady states, depending
on the parameters of the model. One steady state implies a horizontal coalition
where inequality is low and redistribution is high. The other steady state implies
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a vertical coalition where inequality is high and redistribution is low. The steady
state with a vertical coalition exists only when the rate of return is sufficiently
low, and the poor suffer sufficiently high losses in the first period of the horizontal
coalition (µ low). In that case, the poor are willing to give up all redistribution in
the vertical coalition while the rich find it worth to sacrifice the higher investment
opportunities that the horizontal coalition would bring. The steady state with a
horizontal coalition is assured to exist in the reverse case. There are configurations
of the parameters (when 1 < 1µR < R), where the two steady states coexist. Figure
1 plots the function f (kt) depicting such a situation.
Figure 1
It is of particular interest to study the ways in which a vertical coalition with high
inequality may break, paving the way for a transition towards a horizontal coalition
with low inequality. There are two particularly interesting cases in which this may
occur in this model, which are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 considers the
effect of an increase in R, while Figure 3 depicts the effect of an increase in µ and
θ, of the same proportion.
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Figure 2
Suppose the initial situation is the vertical coalition steady state kS . If the
rate of return increases, the threshold θλµ 1R2 shifts leftwards. The elite breaks the
vertical social contract in order to exploit the benefits from the higher investment
returns that the horizontal coalition enables. The poor are then lead to organize.
They suffer a painful transition in the process, but eventually reap the benefits from
organization and obtain a high level of redistribution, which remains thereafter.
Figure 3
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If, in contrast, µ and θ increase in the same proportions, the transition is differ-
ent. The threshold θλµ 1R2 does not move, but the left piece of f (kt) shifts upwards.
This type of increase captures a situation here the elite has been weakened for ex-
ogenous reasons, so that a horizontal coalition brings more benefits to the poor in
the two periods. The poor, in that way, are able to extract more transfers from
the rich while remaining in the vertical coalition. These transfers, however, make
their offsprings richer so that consumption fluctuations become less painful and the
horizontal coalition more attractive. Eventually, the horizontal coalition is worth
undertaking and inequality becomes permanently reduced.
4. Discussion
This section discusses some stylized facts concerning inequality, redistribution
and coalitions in the light of the model presented above. It compares, first, Latin
America, and to a lesser extent the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with
Western European Countries. In a similar vein, preindustrial Europe is contrasted
with contemporary Europe, using the case of England as an illustration. This
section aims at illustrating that the the factors considered in this paper are relevant
for understanding inequality persistence. However, it does not, in any way, claim
that these are the only relevant factors. Likewise, it does not aim at providing a
review on these varied and enormous topics, but just at providing some examples
that illustrate the main points.
4.1. Latin America and MENA vs. Western Europe. The model presented
can help explaining the persistent differences in inequality observed between certain
world regions. Latin America and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), are considered regions with high degrees of economic inequality.
Dollar and Kraay (2001), for instance, estimate an average Gini coefficient in the
MENA of 9 percentage points (pp.) higher than in the OECD countries over the
period 1950 to 1999; the figure for Latin America is 15 pp. The aforementioned
Frankema Gini coefficients for land inequality yield comparable results, with a
difference between the MENA and Western Europe of 8 pp., and of 18 pp. for
Latin America. For the case of Latin America, redistribution levels also appear to
be substantially lower than in developed countries. While the latter collected in
taxes over the 90s, on average, 29 percent of GDP, the figure for Latin America for
that period was almost half, 15 percent. This difference was mainly accounted for
by individual income taxes, usually the most redistributive component of taxation,
and by social security payments, associated to the typically redistributive welfare
state (see De Ferranti et al. (2003)).
These differences in inequality and redistribution coexist with substantial dif-
ferences in the degree of worker's organization. Although measurable indicators
are elusive, scholars of the region offer a clear picture: horizontal organization has
traditionally been less prominent in Latin America and the MENA than it has been
in Western Europe. De Ferranti et al. (2003), argue that, in Latin America, re-
lations between the elite and the poor are characterized by vertical arrangements,
either formal (corporatist) or informal (clientelist). In both cases, the arrangement
is characterized by an elite offer of favors and/ or benefits, in exchange for political
support and, ultimately, for maintaining the existing social order. Compared to the
European experience, the organized working class in Latin America has typically
been considered as historically weak and divided. At times, the working classes did
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unite for the pursuit of particular reforms, but these moments of unity where tem-
porary, and the organized labor movement appears not to have been particularly
prominent in the process (Peloso (2003)). In the analysis of political systems in
the MENA, the word corporatism is often encountered as well, and patron-client
relations appear to be pervasive. Until recently, the political situation in the region
was characterized by the concept of Arab social contract, whereby rulers offered
subsidies and government employment to the masses in exchange for quiescence
and lack of political agitation. Working class movements have barely had popular
support in the MENA region. Instead, vertical arrangements cutting across class
lines, such as nationalist movements or ethnic-based groups have been the norm
(Ayubi (1995) and Richards and Waterbury (1996)).
In this way, the MENA region and, above all, Latin America, can be thought of
as corresponding to the high-inequality steady state of the model, where the type
of coalition formed is vertical. Contemporary Western Europe, in contrast, would
correspond to the low inequality steady state with a horizontal coalition.
In recent decades, the two regions have undergone important social changes.
In Latin America, the pro-market, budget-cutting 90s appear to be giving way to
left-leaning governments in important countries of the region; horizontal coalitions
likewise appear to have become more prominent in recent times (Shefner (2001)).
Similarly, the 90s in the MENA saw an important challenge for the Arab social
contract, with many countries suffering violent riots and protests. Interestingly,
these developments are typically attributed to austerity measures imposed by inter-
national organizations in order to provide credit. In that sense, the insights of this
paper can prove useful, particularly, regarding the link between vertical coalitions
and the characteristics of alternative investments opportunities for the elite: credit
restrictions, by rising the value of present wealth in the 80s, would induce the elites
to cut the transfers associated to the vertical social contract, leading in this way
horizontal organizations to become more prominent. While this seems to have been
largely the case in Latin America, it is interesting to notice, however, that the most
prominent type of coalition that has aroused recently in Middle Eastern countries,
the Islamists, do not aim specifically at increasing redistribution.
4.2. Modern England. Recent studies have provided evidence on inequality and
redistribution in England from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries (see Lin-
dert (2004) for redistribution and Lindert (2000) for a review of the studies on
inequality). Some controversy remains in the assessment of the trends in inequal-
ity, particularly, regarding whether inequality (of earnings as well as income and
wealth) rose or not before the end of the nineteenth century. What seems uncontro-
versial, however, is that both income and wealth inequality gradually fell from the
beginning of the twentieth century onwards (see Lindert (2000)).4 This gradual fall
in inequality coincides with the start of a substantial upward trend in redistribu-
tion. Besides a particular episode in the beginning of the nineteenth century, social
spending in England had been essentially negligible up to the end of the nineteenth
century (Lindert 2004). From then on, matters started to change. As mentioned
in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), the share of taxes in GDP rose dramatically
towards the end of the nineteenth century and so did its progressivity. Moreover,
4Up to, obviously, the well documented rise in inequality during the 1980's.
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it is precisely around this period where the educational system became open to the
masses and public expenditures per pupil started accelerating (Lindert (2004)).
How these trends came into being is obviously the consequence of the interplay
of many forces. Here, some forces are isolated yielding a consistent narrative. Up
to the nineteenth century, a social contract whereby the elite insured the poor
and transferred a modest amounts of resources was in place. This social contract
took the form, among others, of customary rights of the poor (Quigley (1996),
Hobsbawm and Rude (1969)), of price controls of bread in order to isolate the
poor from variable food prices (Davies (2004), Thompson (1971)) and of "old poor
laws" which, to a certain extent, assured the survival of the poor. These measures
aimed partly at maintaining the existing social order. For instance, Van Leuween
(1994), discussing the role of poor relief in preindustrial Europe, argues: "Socially,
European elites endeavored to stabilize the existing social order by means of poor
relief. [...] the well to do were under an obligation to assist the poor and the latter
had a duty to accept the world as it was" (p. 593). This system of duties and
obligations characterizes a traditional social contract or, in the terminology used
in the model, a vertical coalition. Indeed, while this system was in place, the poor
remained unorganized.
The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed the culmination of the pro-
cess of deterioration of the traditional social contract. Key protecting laws were
definitively repealed. The enclosure movement was at its heights bringing forward
the process of privatization of the commons which, by 1832, was completed. Cru-
cially, the poor relief system was transformed by the New Poor Law, enacted in
1834. The New Poor Law centralized the administration of relief, made conditions
of eligibility more stringent and set up mechanisms in order to deter demand for
relief. Meanwhile, spending in poor relief fell substantially (Lindert (2004)). Polany
(1954) considered the enactment of New Poor Law in 1834 as the symbol of the
demise of the traditional social contract and this view appears to be largely shared
by more recent studies (Dunkley (1981), Mandler (1987)).
This same time period, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, is pre-
cisely the one chosen by Thompson in his influential work on The Making of the
English Working Class (1979). Thompson studies the variety of factors and expe-
riences leading to the configuration of the English working class. The importance
attributed to the collapse of the traditional social contract for this making is best
illustrated by the figure of William Cobbett. William Cobbett was a radical jour-
nalist, who later got elected to parliament. His pamphlets and newsletters had
remarkably high circulation from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until the 1830's.
Indeed, he is considered to have been a key figure in bringing about a Radical con-
sensus (Thompson (1979)). The radical criticism of Cobbett turned heavily against
"Old Corruption" (the political elite of the time) and in defense of the traditional
rights of labouring people. On these latter, it is worth quoting him extensively:
Among these rights was, the right to live in the country of our
birth; the right to have a living out of the land of our birth in
exchange for our labour duly and honestly performed; the right,
case we fell into distress, to have our wants sufficiently relieved
out of the produce of the land, whether that distress arose from
sickness, from decrepitude, from old age, or from inability to find
employment. [...] For a thousand years, necessity was relieved out
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of the produce of the Tithes. When the Tithes were taken away by
the aristocracy, and by them kept to themselves, or given wholly to
the parsons, provision was made out of the land, as compensation
for what had been taken away. That compensation was given in
the rates as settled by the poor-law. The taking away of those
rates was to violate the agreement, which gave as much right to
receive in case of need, as it left the landowner a right to his rent.5
This interpretation of the past was highly idealistic. What is important to note
here is that these ideas did connect with the experiences of labouring people and
that appears to have been relevant for the formation of a genuinely horizontally
organized (working class) movement (Thompson 1979).
In the late 1830's, soon after the New Poor Law was enacted, what is regarded as
the first organized English working class movement, Chartism, came into being. It
did not demand the return to a traditional social order, but parliamentary reform,
including universal suffrage. Although the movement failed in the mid century, it is
considered to have set the stage for future working class organized movements and
demands. An important part of these demands were eventually met and became
law. Notably, the franchise was gradually extended and, by 1884, already included
substantial working class representation. From that point, the degree of redistribu-
tion did not take long to rise and the level of inequality, to decrease (see Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000) and Lindert (2004)).
The above quote of William Cobbett illustrates well the contemporary view that
the traditional social contract had been broken by the elite, by failing to honour
the obligations it imposed on them. In that respect, it is interesting to notice that
this occurred in the midst of the industrial revolution, where technological improve-
ments made investments more profitable. This transformation, hence, illustrates
well the role of the rate of return in the model. The alternative way in which
the demise of the traditional social contract gives way to worker organization in
the model can be illustrated by contrasting the English experience with that of
Germany. In Germany, the Napoleonic occupation and the 1848 march revolution
(both absent in England), eroded the legitimacy and the power of the elite. After
unification, power was centralized and the state grew stronger. Junkers and heavy
industrialists did benefit from the state intervention, but their marriage of iron and
rye, seems to have been overplayed, and the chancellor did indeed use divide and
rule strategies over the elite (Blackbourn (1997)). The insights of the model can
thus make sense of the well known instauration of a social security system in the
1880s that aimed to halt the labor movement, but patently failed to do so. In that
way, the relative weakness of the elite in Germany may help explain its different
path towards working class organization compared to that of England.
5. Concluding Remarks
Social contracts are a relevant factor for understanding the persistent inequality
differences across regions of the world as well as for the remarkable evolution of
inequality in Western Europe. This paper shows that the interactions between
inequality and the type of coalition formed in a society can give rise to self-sustained
social contracts where inequality persists: because the poor take time to organize,
5Tour of Scotland (1833), cited in EP Thompson (1979), pp. 836-837.
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when inequality is high, the poor are vulnerable to consumption fluctuations and
are willing to give up substantial redistribution in order to be protected from these.
For the rich, this traditional social contract is an investment. If the rate of return
to alternative investments rises substantially or the elite becomes weakened, this
traditional social contract may break, paving the way for working class organization
and a permanent decrease in inequality.
These insights were shown using a simple model. For the sake of tractability and
clarity, several simplifying assumptions were made. Indeed, a full understanding
of the complexities of social contracts was well beyond the scope of this paper. It
is worth mentioning certain elements not considered in the model that stand out
for their importance, and that deserve (and are indeed receiving in the literature)
further attention. First, individual heterogeneity was restricted to two types of
individuals holding different amounts of wealth. The important role of the middle
classes for the type of coalition formed (stressed, for instance, in Luebbert (1987)
for the interwar period in Europe), needs to be addressed. Second, the model
has focused on co-optation, leaving aside the other crucial element used by elites
and rulers to maintain the existing social order: repression. Third, as the case of
England shows, insurance is a particularly important element of traditional social
contracts. Acknowledging the role of insurance can help shedding light into an-
other important component in the transformation of the social contract in Europe
related to the type of protest: from riots to organized protest. As certain authors
have noted (Thompson (1971), Rude (1964)), riots can be understood as ways for
the poor to enforce the traditional social contract. Finally, as the experience in
the MENA shows, the type of coalitions allowed to form needs to be expanded.
In the MENA, tribal groups have traditionally played a crucial political role and
the strongest organized opposition are Islamist movements appealing to religious
identity rather than class. The emergence of identity-based movements and its
interactions with inequality need to be further studied to account for additional
types of social contracts. Studying theoretically all these mechanisms at a moment
where efforts are being made to gather empirical evidence on inequality back into
the distant past (Piketty (2005), Bourguignon and Morrison (2002)) will greatly
enhance our understanding of the dynamics of inequality over the long haul.
Nevertheless, the model in this paper can give useful insights for policy. First,
as the experience in Latin America shows, elections are not enough for achieving a
significant decrease in inequality. The model of this paper points at the importance
of aversion to consumption fluctuations that extreme poverty generates. In that
respect, the policy followed by the World Bank and certain governments (for in-
stance, those of the European Nordic countries) in channeling their aid towards the
poorest of the poor, is well targeted. Further measures should include, according
to the model, access to financial markets by the poor. This would help smoothing
their consumption and, additionally, give them access to investment opportunities
as the rich have. Possibly the most important measure of all would be an appro-
priate working of the rule of law. This is relevant to ensure a credible commitment
for the part of the elites, thus enabling the formation of efficient vertical coalitions.
Particular attention should be paid on eroding the power of the local elites, which
tend to be more easily arbitrary.
Achieving these goals is not straightforward for external actors, since their part-
ners are, almost inevitably, the elites. This paper points at another problem in this
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respect: the poor may actually rally together with the elites against externally-
advocated reforms. This may be the case even if these reforms may actually benefit
the poor in the long run. Social contracts indeed have a rationale and, in this
paper, that rationale is the painful transition that the poor would suffer on the way
to a more beneficial social contract. Particular importance, therefore, needs to be
attached to safety nets in transitions as well as to a gradual enhancement of civil
society organizations.
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